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Abstract This research note considers how to track long-term trajec-
tories of political discontent in Britain. Many accounts are confined to 
using either survey data drawn from recent decades or imperfect behav-
ioral measures such as voting or party membership as indicators of 
political disengagement. We instead develop an approach that provides 
the long view on political disaffection. We first consider time-series 
data available from repeated survey measures. We next replicate historic 
survey questions to observe change in public opinion relative to earlier 
points in time. Finally, we use Stimson’s (1991) dyad-ratios algorithm to 
construct an over-time index of political discontent that combines data 
from multiple poll series. This reveals rising levels of political discon-
tent for both specific and diffuse measures of mass opinion. Our method 
and findings offer insights into the rising tide of disillusionment afflict-
ing many contemporary democracies.
Will Jennings is a professor of political science and public policy at the University of 
Southampton, Southampton, UK. Nick Clarke is an associate professor of human geography at 
the University of Southampton, Southampton, UK. Jonathan Moss is a senior research assistant 
at the University of Southampton, Southampton, UK. Gerry Stoker is chair of governance at the 
University of Southampton, Southampton, UK, and Centenary Research Professor of Governance 
at the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra, Canberra, Australia. 
The authors thank Roger Mortimore and Laurence Stellings and participants at a workshop at 
New Place, Southampton, for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. The authors 
also thank YouGov for conducting the October 2014 online survey that is used in their analy-
sis; and they thank the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on the 
manuscript. This work was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council for 
the research project “Popular Understandings of Politics in Britain, 1937–2014” [ES/L007185/1 
to N.C., G.S., and W.J.]. *Address correspondence to Will Jennings, Department of Politics & 
International Relations, University of Southampton, University Road, Southampton SO17 1BJ, 
UK; e-mail: w.j.jennings@soton.ac.uk.
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 3, Fall 2017, pp. 748–758
doi:10.1093/poq/nfx020 Advance Access publication May 31, 2017
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/81/3/748/3858932
by Sussex Language Institute user
on 10 November 2017
Many claim that contemporary politics is afflicted by a rising tide of political 
disaffection reflected in negative attitudes toward mainstream politicians and 
institutions and the rise of electoral support for unconventional or populist candi-
dates and parties (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal 
and Montero 2006). The underlying concern is that discontent may make it more 
difficult for governments to act effectively (Hetherington 2006; Hetherington 
and Rudolph 2015). Others argue, in contrast, that a degree of distrust of govern-
ment and politics is healthy in a democracy (Rosanvallon 2008), or that political 
discontent is not on the rise and that public opinion is characterized by trendless 
fluctuation rather than clear decline (Norris 2011; Merkel 2014).
A conceptual starting point is David Easton’s (1965) well-known distinc-
tion between specific and diffuse support for political systems. The former 
concerns support for the government of the day, its leaders, and its policies. 
The latter refers to support for the basic political arrangements of politics and 
democracy. Trends in diffuse support are the primary focus of our attention. 
Are we witnessing a level of disillusionment with mainstream politics that is 
unremarkable and within the bounds of the “normal,” or are we seeing evi-
dence of sustained decline in diffuse support?
Taking a long view of public opinion, however, is not straightforward. 
Evidence used on either side of the debate to assess trends in the disaffection 
of citizens with politics is complicated by the limited time frame of the data 
available. Pharr and Putnam (2000) rely upon a small number of time points or 
data over just a couple of decades (waves of the World Values Survey during 
the period between 1981 and 1996). Norris (2011) looks at trends in satisfac-
tion with democracy back to the 1970s (based on data from the Eurobarometer 
survey from 1973 to 2009).
The puzzle of whether political disaffection has been on the rise is, there-
fore, confounded by the spottiness and sparseness of available data, in par-
ticular prior to the 1970s. Behavioral measures of political engagement, such 
as voting or party membership, have obvious limits as substitute indicators of 
political discontent (for example, does non-voting reflect discontent or satis-
faction?). Even beyond this, the sorts of expressions of political discontent that 
have been the subject of survey research in different periods tend to reflect the 
prevailing concerns and circumstances of the time.
Tracking long-term trajectories of political disaffection in a way that over-
comes such data limitations thus poses a substantial methodological chal-
lenge. This research note shows that we can address this challenge through 
use of trend data from repeated survey measures and contemporary replica-
tion of historic survey questions, combined with Stimson’s (1991) dyad-ratios 
algorithm, to draw out trends from a range of related survey questions. Our 
analysis draws on survey measures of British public attitudes as far back as 
1944. Aside from the United States, Britain has more historical survey data 
pertaining to trust and disaffection than any other country and offers a promi-
nent case for the rise of political discontent (Hay 2007; Stoker 2017).
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Meeting the Challenge: First Steps
A more long-term view on diffuse support in British politics can be derived 
from trends in survey questions that have been asked on regular occasions 
over an extended period. The most widely used measure of diffuse support is a 
question that has been asked in the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey since 
1986: “How much do you trust British governments of any party to place the 
needs of the nation above the interests of their own political party?” The per-
centage of respondents replying “almost never” (rather than “most of the time” 
or “almost always”) is plotted in figure 1. This reveals a steady decline in trust 
in government to set partisan interests aside in the wider public interest. Over 
roughly the same period, Ipsos MORI asked for a range of groups of people, 
including politicians generally, whether respondents “generally trust them to 
tell the truth or not.” The percentage of respondents saying they do not trust 
politicians to tell the truth is also plotted in figure 1. Using this measure, the 
level of distrust is much higher, but the upward trend is much less pronounced.
This mixed picture shows how the chosen survey measure can shape under-
standing of long-term trends in the withdrawal of diffuse support. The time 
frame is also important. If 1983 or 1993 is taken as the starting point in the 
Ipsos MORI poll series, current levels of distrust appear to have returned to 
their equilibrium—after a slightly more optimistic period. If 1999 is instead 
taken as the benchmark, it appears as if there has been a steady erosion of trust 
in politicians.
An alternative to using trend data is to detect long-term shifts in public atti-
tudes through contemporary replication of historic survey measures. By field-
ing questions asked at earlier points in time, it is possible to observe change 
(or stability) in public opinion.1 For example, in October 2014 we commis-
sioned an online survey of 2,103 respondents by YouGov, which asked a ques-
tion originally fielded by Gallup in July 1944 and again in August 1972: “Do 
you think that British politicians are out merely for themselves, for their party, 
or to do their best for their country?” The proportion of responses for each is 
plotted in figure 2.
From observing public opinion on this question over an extended period, 
certain patterns become apparent. First, there is only a slight increase in the 
percentage of respondents viewing British politicians as self-seeking between 
1944 and 1972 (increasing from 35 to 38 percent), but rather more of a fall in 
the number believing politicians are out to do the best for their country (from 
36 to 28 percent). There is a much bigger shift, however, between 1972 and 
2014 in the proportion seeing politicians as out for themselves (rising from 
1. One possible constraint on this strategy is the degree to which questions are context or time 
specific. A further limitation is the extent to which point estimates derived from surveys using 
different methodologies are directly comparable, though these can provide important information 
on the direction and approximate degree of change.
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Figure 2. British Politicians Out for Themselves, Their Party, or Their 
Country, 1944–2014.
Figure 1. Distrust in British Government and Politicians, 1983–2015.
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38 to 48 percent) and out for their country (slumping from 28 to 10 percent). 
What this approach cannot do is fill in the missing gaps for the periods where 
a survey question has not been fielded.
Meeting the Challenge: A Longitudinal Measure of 
Political Discontent
Notwithstanding discontinuities in available data, every repeated survey meas-
ure provides some information about long-term trends in political disaffection. 
Observations at different time points indicate the direction of travel of public 
opinion on that particular measure for a defined period. Trends across multi-
ple measures may exhibit common variance, which is informative about the 
prevailing mood of public opinion toward politics, politicians, and the system 
of government.
Using Stimson’s (1991) dyad-ratios algorithm, we construct an index of 
political discontent based on 37 survey questions, asked 295 times over the 
period between 1944 and 2016 (in practice, most are from mid-1960s onward, 
so estimates are not reliable prior to this). This method has been used previ-
ously to generate measures of trust in US government (Chanley, Rudolph, and 
Rahn 2000; Keele 2007). Here, it is used to measure the latent dimension of 
public expressions of discontent toward politics, politicians, and the political 
system. Simply, it captures the relative degree to which the public is more or 
less disaffected with politics. Stimson’s method offers a solution to the prob-
lem of irregular and infrequent availability of poll data. The principle behind 
the dyad-ratios algorithm is intuitive; it uses the ratio of aggregate-level sur-
vey responses (“marginals”) to the same question, at different points in time, 
to derive information about the relative state of public opinion—telling us 
whether, on average, public attitudes have become more negative or positive 
toward politics and politicians (see Stimson [1991, appendix 1] and Bartle, 
Dellepiane-Avallaneda, and Stimson [2011] for discussion of the method).2 
This extracts the underlying tendency of all survey items relating to political 
2. Each survey item can be expressed as the ratio of feelings toward politics at two points in time: 
a “dyad.” This ratio provides an estimate of relative political discontent, for a given question, in 
years t+i and t+j:
 P X
Xij
t i
t j
=
+
+  
This enables recursive estimation of the index of political discontent for each survey item for 
each time period based on all data available. Because there are multiple estimates of political 
discontent (i.e., there are multiple survey items) and they are not all equivalent indicators of the 
latent construct, the dyad-ratios algorithm estimates the squared correlation of each series with 
the underlying dimension and uses this to weight the series (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and 
Stimson 2011, p. 269). This correlation is interpretable as a factor loading, and is reported below 
for selected survey items.
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distrust, disaffection, alienation, and so on, analogous to a principal compo-
nents approach. We use data from a range of sources, including the British 
Social Attitudes survey, the British Election Study, European Social Survey, 
Eurobarometer, Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement, and poll data 
from Gallup, YouGov, and Ipsos MORI.
Table 1 reports the factor loading of each survey item and the proportion of 
variance explained by the underlying factor. This reveals that a substantial pro-
portion of variance loads onto a single underlying dimension, indicating the 
central tendency in public opinion. This accounts for 50 percent of all variance 
in survey questions on disaffection with politics.3 The loading (i.e., correlation 
with the underlying construct) of a number of survey items is considerable. 
For instance, the loading of the BSA (no) trust in government series is 0.864, 
while that for the Ipsos MORI (do not) trust politicians to tell the truth series 
is somewhat lower, at 0.609, but still substantial. The loading of the Gallup 
survey question about whether politicians are out for themselves, discussed 
above, is 0.991. What is striking is that this co-variation of expressions of 
political disaffection extends across a wide range of measures, some relating 
to truth-telling, being out of touch with voters, being self-interested or vote-
seekers, improper use of public office, or lacking in integrity. Most of these 
load to a greater or lesser degree onto the underlying construct of political dis-
content. The prevailing sentiment, or “mood” (Stimson 1991), in public opin-
ion underlies a range of survey responses. This is consistent with commonality 
observed in expressions of discontent at the individual level (Jennings, Stoker, 
and Twyman 2016).
The resulting measure of public discontent with national politics is plotted 
by the solid line in figure 3. This reveals a steady rise in discontentment from 
1966 to 2016.4 Combined with the previous evidence on trends and dyadic 
analysis, we have strong evidence for a sustained growth in discontent with 
politics over more than half a century. Figure 3 also shows a striking contrast 
between the slow and steady rise of discontent (that represents a loss of diffuse 
support) with dissatisfaction with particular governments (specific support). 
The dashed line in figure 3 plots the annual average of survey measures of 
government dissatisfaction, from long-running Gallup and Ipsos MORI series 
(Gallup ceased political polling in Britain in 2001).5 While there is a good 
3. Sensitivity analysis, dropping one survey item at a time from the measure, indicates that it is 
highly robust to the available data (i.e. the average correlation with the measure is 0.99 and the 
proportion of variance explained ranges from 48 to 54 percent). Estimation of the underlying fac-
tor is not contingent on inclusion or exclusion of particular data series.
4. The line of best fit for a linear regression of our measure of political discontent as a function of 
time indicates that it has been growing at a rate of 0.2 points per year over this fifty-year period.
5. The Gallup version of the question asked, “Do you approve or disapprove of the Government’s 
record to date?” while the Ipsos MORI question is worded, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with 
the way … the Government is running the country?” The correlation of these series for the over-
lapping period is equal to 0.98 (p = 0.000).
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degree of parallelism in rising levels of dissatisfaction, there are important 
differences. When it comes to specific support, the trends are more volatile, 
responding to events and replacement of incumbents by the electorate. Overall, 
there is still a movement toward a loss of specific support to match the loss 
of diffuse support. What is driving these changes is a larger question beyond 
the scope of this research note (see Jennings, Stoker, and Twyman [2016] and 
Stoker [2017] for some analysis). But it is interesting to note that while polari-
zation has been linked to rising political distrust in the United States (e.g., 
Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), if anything 
the relationship is in the other direction for Britain—where the parties have 
depolarized since the 1980s.6
Conclusions
Our analysis resolves the question of whether political discontent has increased 
over time, in the case of Britain. Extensive survey evidence between 1944 and 
the present has been drawn upon to assess relative changes in attitudes about 
Figure 3. Political Discontent and Government Dissatisfaction in Britain, 
1966–2015.
6. The correlation between political discontent and elite polarization (as measured by policy dis-
tance between party platforms) is not statistically significant for the twelve election years between 
1966 and 2015 (r = –0.247, p = 0.438).
Jennings et al.756
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/81/3/748/3858932
by Sussex Language Institute user
on 10 November 2017
politics, measured at two or more points in time. Specifically, evidence from 
time-series trends and contemporary replication of historic survey questions 
has been inspected and the dyad-ratios algorithm used to construct a longitu-
dinal measure of political discontent that captures the underlying dimension of 
popular expressions of disaffection with politics. Together, these findings sup-
port the claim of rising discontentment among citizens, and of the withdrawal 
of diffuse support. We can be clear that there was no golden age of democracy, 
as a degree of public skepticism about the political system appears to have 
been present throughout. We are also able to come down against the “trendless 
fluctuation” thesis (see Norris [2011]) for Britain, at least if the full postwar 
period is considered.
Our analysis provides researchers in other countries with some possible 
clues about how debates over the long-term trajectory of anti-politics might 
be resolved in the face of data scarcity and limited time frames of analysis. 
Establishing the temporal scope of anti-politics is also a prerequisite for 
explaining it (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997). We offer a step forward. Given 
evidence of long-term decline in diffuse support, explanations that reflect 
long-term trends in politics, society, and media appear to fit best. Taking the 
long view thus offers a promising way of understanding the populist challenge 
that is facing many contemporary democracies.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are freely available at Public Opinion Quarterly online. 
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the empirical results are 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/Q3OM0J.
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